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Peirce's Phaneroscopy and Husserl’s Phenomenology1
Is phaneroscopy, in a shape given by Peirce, phenomenology? –
the  following  remarks  are  based  on  this  question.  As  is  well
known,  Peirce  was  a  chemist,  he  esteemed  Hegel  and  knew
Husserl, although judged him sternly. And after taking these facts
into consideration, it is easy to be at a loss. Is it not possible that
Peirce’s conception of phenomenology can be perceived as if drift-
ing among the three poles, brushing the sense entangled in a con-
ception of  the  macroscopic  thermodynamics2,  sounding with  an
echo of the phenomenology of Spirit,  approaching the Husserl’s
conception of the a priori science about the contents of pure exper-
iences’ ideas? The situation is not made easier due to Peirce’s ter-
minological indecision, as he wrote not only on one occasion about
phenomenology  and  on  another  about  phaneroscopy,  but  also
about ideoscopy and the universal theory of categories – categorics.
The reasons for this state of affairs and possible solutions to the
associated  problems  were  analysed  by Herbert  Spiegelberg  and
William Rosensohn3. And here it is enough to state the following:
Peirce used the term categorics in the manuscript MS L75 (cf. also
C.P.1.2804), because indeed his phenomenology is realized in the
1 The text is an Eng1ish version of the Po1ish one. This is inc1uded in: A.J.
Nowak, Świat Człowieka. Kraków 2002. 
2 This thermodynamics is contrasted with the statistical one.
3 Cf. e.g.: (a) H. Spiegelberg, “Husser1’s and Peirce’s Phenomenologies: Coinci-
dence or Interaction” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XVII 2, 1956; (b) W.
Rosensohn, The Phenomenology of Charles S. Peirce. Amsterdam 1974.
4 The reference was prepared in accordance with the international standard; its




universal theory of categories. It is also not unlikely that the prin-
ciple of observableness is here a distant echo of conceptions based
on the  natural  science.  And,  formally  speaking,  the  idea  of  the
three stages of thoughts, characteristic of Hegel, resembles Peirce’s
triadic scheme of categories;  however,  in this case,  he distanced
himself from the German idealist (C.P.8.298). Finally, it seems that
Husserl might have accepted, at least as a preparatory definition of
phenomenology, the following description, in which Peirce estab-
lished that “Phaneroscopy is the description of the  phaneron; and
by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way
or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it
corresponds to any real thing or not” (C.P.l.284). What is more, it
does not seem probable that the author of Logische Untersuchungen
could have had a grievance against the author of On a New List of
Categories on account of the following comment: “phenomenology
might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the
statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different ele-
ments which seem to present themselves in what seems (...) It can
hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a con-
clusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while
in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are cer-
tain seemings; (…) Phenomenology can only tell the reader which
way to look and to see what he shall see” (C.P.2.197). It does not
result from this quotation that Peirce’s phenomenology, i.e. phan-
eroscopy, had nothing to do with truth and was concerned only
with free seemings. It is only that, in Peirce’s opinion, phenomeno-
logical  principles  do  not  express  factual  truths.  And  not  only
Husserl  but also an ordinary physicist, would have agreed with
that the moment they would have realized that the simple equa-
tion of gaseous state, formulated for the ideal gases, does not ex-
press empirical facts, unless it is a pure fantasy.
*
In  any case,  the  fact  is  that  the  relation of  Peirce’s  views to
Husserl’s is the crucial matter due to the fact that, as Joseph Rans-
dell has rightly remarked, Husserl’s conception acquired status of
a fundamental solution totally independently of whether the solu-
sorne, P. Weiss. Cambridge, Mass. 1958. “C.P.1.280” should be read: Co1lected Pa-
pers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1 § 280.
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tion alone is accepted or not5. It enables us to essentially narrow
down the  field  of  the  problem.  Unfortunately,  the  considerable
simplification of the matter does not follow. As far back as in 1947
Roman Ingarden wrote: “The term «phenomenology» has got dif-
ferent meanings according to Husserl and his disciples, meanings
that have never been precisely worked out. The researchers distan-
cing themselves from phenomenology used (...) this term with so
fantastic meanings that they had very little or even nothing to do
with Husserl’s conception of phenomenology”6.
Despite  the  indefiniteness,  one  thing  remains  obvious.
Husserl’s  project  is  connected with the idea of epoché. Can any-
thing similar be said about Peirce’s idea? – Is it based on the reduc-
tion’s requirement interpreted in one way or another? Ransdell re-
cognized that it is not7. However, he did not tempt to specify be-
forehand, in view of the negative answer, the sense of bracketing.
All the same, Husserl probably understood the reduction in three
ways:  as  (a)  the phenomenological  reduction,  (b)  the transcend-
ental  reduction,  (c)  the eidetic  reduction.  The phenomenological
reduction simplifies the world of transcendental objects to the one
of immanent phenomena. Suzanne Cunningham recognized that it
means the reduction of real transcendental objects to real imman-
ent objects by the means of bracketing the three-dimensional exist-
ence of the first ones8. The phenomenological reduction, due to im-
manence, internalization of the objects of experience,  reveals the
basic shape of the objective pole of consciousness – the shape of
the focus of senses’ bearers; the transcendental reduction, on the
other hand, reveals the undeniable subjective pole of conscious-
ness – transcendental  ego.  Moreover,  just like the phenomenolo-
gical reduction, the transcendental one reveals the objects of exper-
5 Cf. J. Ransdell,. “Peirce est-il un phénoménologue”, Études Phénoménologigues
9–10, 1989. Incidentally, the question from the title of Ransdell’s text is not a sur-
prising one as it cou1d have been formed even in connection with Roman Ingar-
den; cf. K. Okopień, “Czy Ingarden jest fenomenologiem?”,  Studia Filozoficzne  5,
1989.
6 R. Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt.
7 Cf. J. Ransdell, “Peirce est-ill...” op. cit. p. 23.
8 Cf. S. Cunningham, Language and the Phenomenological Reduction of




ience in the basic shape of a giver of any sense and of a factor in-
dicating the objects of consciousness as so and so existing9.
These two briefly discussed reductions – if they really are two
processes10 – limit the field of consciousness into the sphere of sep-
arate phenomena. However, this sphere is not an enchanted circle,
as the conscious subject can achieve two things. First of all, it is
able to parametrise and take its object as a constant of the experi-
ence, changing at the same time the methods of its conscious for-
mulations. In this way the conscious subject reveals what is abso-
lutely necessary in the object. Then it is given an opportunity to act
in reverse. At that point the modus of the act is firmly established
and  its  object  undergoes  the  process  of  change.  As  a  result,
everything  that  is  absolutely  necessary for  a  given act  becomes
evident. When following a given way, the conscious subject makes
the  eidetic  reduction,  eidetic  one  because  leading  towards  the
ideal, that is timeless, world of pure abilities or beings. They are
pure because they consist only of necessary conditions, conditions
not so much of being independent objects but being phenomena
experienced11. In Peirce’s own words, the eidetic reduction is to ex-
pose absolutely necessary elements, without which nothing is able
to enter the relation of to know to a knower.
Peirce, who repeated often enough, that it is not about abstain-
ing from hypostatisation but  about  hypostatising well,  certainly
would have called the eidetic reduction a beautiful model of a hy-
postatic abstraction. A beautiful one, but at the same time unac-
ceptable for him. Why? First of all because of the vapidity of even
its best applications. Husserl thought that through the reductions
all  things  that  are absolutely  universal,  necessary and exact  are
made available to the man. Peirce, however, wrote: “I object to ab-
solute universality, absolute exactitude, absolute necessity,  being
attributed to any proposition that does not deal with the Alpha
and the Omega, in the which I do not include any object of ordin-
ary  knowledge”  (C.P.6.607).  Briefly,  and  in  Peirce’s  manner  of
speaking, it is impossible to achieve the aims of the eidetic reduc-
tion established by Husserl, even if it is possible to use this reduc-
tion as a certain (but not never-failing) technique of experiencing.
9 Cf. ibid. p. 9.
10 Cf. ibid. p. 8.
11 Cf. ibid. p. 9–10.
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But – secondly – is the latter possibility really relevant here?
And here the answer has to be negative, at least from the Peirce’s
point of view. It can be clearly observed that the eidetic reduction
cannot take place without categorial  intuition,  both in the wide
and in the narrow sense of the word, already presented in the pas-
sage  dedicated  to  Heidegger’s  views.  At  the  same  time  Peirce
strongly refuted the conception of intuition as a credible witness of
cognition. However, he had described it precisely beforehand: “In-
tuition [is] nearly the same as «premiss not itself a conclusion»; the
only difference  being that  premisses  and conclusions are judge-
ments,  whereas  an intuition may (…) be  any kind of  cognition
whatever. But just as conclusion (good or bad) is determined in the
mind of the reasoner by its premiss, so cognitions not judgements
may be determined by previous cognitions; and a cognition not so
determined, and therefore determined directly by the transcend-
ental12 object, is to be termed an intuition” (C.P.5.213).
From the words quoted the following can be concluded. Intu-
ition is not a separate type of cognition, but the epistemic character
which, if it at all can belong to any cognition, belongs to them re-
gardless of their type: cognition of judgement, insight or premiss
etc. And each cognition, if it exists at all, that is not determined by
the logically previous one is marked with this character. However,
contrary to the common opinion,  Peirce  did not  state that  intu-
itions do not exist at all13. On the contrary, he wrote: “Every cogni-
tion,  as  something  present,  is,  of  course,  an  intuition  of  itself”
(C.P.3.214)14. To him this was not a problem. However, he noticed
12 In Peirce’s opinion, intuitus appeared as a technical term for the
first time in St. Anselms’s “Monologium” when he quoted St. Paul’s
famous words: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie
ac faciem; cf. C.P.5 p. 135 § l.
13 Cf. e.g. T.M. Olshewsky, “Realism and Antifoundationalism”, in:
Living Doubt Essays concerning the epistemology of Charles Sanders Peirce.
Ed. G. Debrock, M. Hulswit; Dordrecht–Boston–London 1994.
14 What is more, one can read that: “Intuition is the regarding of the
abstract in a concrete form by the realistic hypostatisation of relations;
that is the one sole method of valuable thought. Very shallow is the
prevalent notion that this is something to be avoided (…) The true
precept  is  not  to  abstain  from  hypostatisation  but  to  do  it  intelli-
gently” (C.P.1.383). As can be seen, Peirce allowed and respected intu-
ition. But it is also evident that this is not what Husserl and his disci -
ples thought it to have been. Peirce’s intuition, bound with realistic
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the problem somewhere else. He thought, not without being right,
that the human being could have depended on intuitions,  if  he
were able to intuitively,  that is unmistakably,  differentiate them
from  cognitions  determined  by  previous  cognitions  (C.P.5.214).
And as he believed that intuition of intuition does not exist, for
him intuition was not a differentiated, as far as the values are con-
cerned, method of cognition15.
This, as a matter of fact moderate attitude, could have become
more severe if Peirce had been asked about the existence of cat-
egorial  intuition in  a  strict  sense.  Then,  maybe,  he  would have
answered with a stern negation. At least at such reaction points the
following reasoning. A situation about someone who states: “This
is red” is considered. He or she who states it is asked to reveal the
reasons for making such a claim. It is very easy to imagine that a
spontaneous reaction would be the words such as “I saw that it
was red”. And for that dictum Peirce’s answer is as follows: “Not at
all. You have not seen anything like that. You have seen an image.
There was no object and no predicate in it.” There was not also – it
is allowed to add – any copula ‘is’ there nor any entity that could
correspond to it.  It  is  clear that  in favourable circumstances the
sentence “This is red” is a true one. But, unlike Husserl, Peirce did
not demand require that those conditions should involve the pres-
ence of all correlates of all the morphemes of the true sentence. He
did not demand that because he would have considered such a de-
mand as a nonsense. At the same time, as is already known, in
hypostatisation, has to have hypothetical nature. It cannot be, as Su-
san Haack would have formulated, epistemically safe, not even men-
tioning apodictic exactness. Cf. S. Haack, “Fallibilism and Necessity”
Synthese 41 (1979) and the polemics: P.L. Mott, “Haack on Fallibilism”
Analysis 40.1 (New Series No 188) October 1980. Obviously, these re-
marks do not solve the problem; especially when it is in the context of
Husserl’s  ideas.  Dagfinn  Føllesdal  states  that  the  founder  of  phe-
nomenology  was  not  a fundamentalist  himself,  that:  “Husserl  em-
braced what [John] Rawls has called the method of «reflective equilib-
rium»” and that method postulates among many others the idea of to-
tal corrigibility of knowledge; D. Føllesdal, “Husserl on Evidence and
Justification”, in: Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition Ed.
R. Sokolowski. Washington: 1988; p. 107; cf. also pp. 117, 121–128.
15 Peirce’s wide argumentation can be found in the essay “Ques-
tions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for a Man”; see C.P.5.213–
263.
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Husserl there exists such a demand and it leads to the theoretical
project  of  categorial  intuition in  a  strict  sense.  This  comparison
speaks for itself. If he had had to, Peirce would have opposed of
this kind of conception, so at the same time the eidetic reduction.
For different reasons, the transcendental reduction would have
shared its fate. It has been already stated that the transcendental
reduction is to lead to the revelation of the necessary, subjective
pole of consciousness. ‘Necessary’ also means ‘being the source of
every sense’ or ‘being the subjective centre of the formation of ob-
jects’ meanings’. In the article already referred to, Ransdell prop-
erly noticed that subjective formation of the meanings could not be
applied to Peirce’s  views in any way.  To make things  perfectly
clear, it is enough to add the following words of the founder of the
modern semiotics: “A sign (...) does not affect its object, but it is be-
ing affected” (C.P.l.538). This sentence means that it is the object
that  defines  the  method of  being represented  by the  sign,  so it
defines the interpretant of the sign, that is its meaning (but not its
logical value)16. As so described, it cannot be the result of the sub-
jective constitutions. It is enough to state that Peirce’s phenomeno-
logy has nothing in common with the transcendental reduction.
We are only left with the problem of the phenomenological re-
duction. Its interpretation, given by Cunningham, is not false, as
this process does not lead the reducer beyond the sphere of reality;
and for Husserl all that is defined in time is real – and so are phe-
nomena. Nevertheless, the limitation of this reduction’s range to
the three-dimensional world is somewhat doubtful. Obviously its
core is the peculiar principle of immanence of the transcendental
objects, as has been stated. This rule is peculiar, because it does not
recommend some,  naturally  ridiculous,  introjection –  putting  re-
duced objects into the contents of consciousness, understood as an
odd container. But consciousness is not a container. At this point
Husserl’s and Peirce’s views are not so different17. For both philo-
16 It is possible, because in Peirce’s opinion the object of the sign has
itself the character of the sign or of the thought.
17 And  not  accidentally.  Richard  Stevens  presented  how  far
Husserl’s view is similar to William James’; cf. R. Stevens,  James and
Husserl:  The  Foundation  of  Meaning.  The  Hague  1974.  On the  other
hand,  James  added  the  last  thought  to  his  view  after  getting  ac-
quainted with Peirce’s harsh criticism; cf. C.P.8.279–301. And Peirce
himself wrote that: “saying about an object that it exists in the mind is
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sophers the sentences “Something is in the consciousness”, “some-
thing is in the mind” mean only that “something exists in relation
known/cogitatum – knower/cogitans. The object, whose existence was
described in a way limited to its  occurrence,  was described im-
manently.
It is only necessary to be careful and not to understand sole “ex-
ist in” in the spirit of the scholastic in mente esse. It would be a fatal
mistake. The aim of the phenomenological reduction is to suspense
metaphysical presuppositions and not to replace the first ones with
the latter. In brief, this aim is to consider the object as appearing
“quite regardless of whether it  corresponds to any real thing or
not”.  Such consideration,  according to Husserl,  is  to lead to the
discovery  of  the  self-explanatory  substances.  This,  however,  is
negated by many Peirce’s statements, one of them being the one
already cited that states that phenomenology is about what seems
and not about what is. However, one is allowed to think – contrary
to Ransdell’s  conclusions – that the weakest version of the phe-
nomenological reduction is written in the Peirce’s project of phe-
nomenology qua phaneroscopy, though it was not given a name. It
is the weakest one, because it is limited to two principles: a) im-
manence of the objects of consciousness b) relative non-assuming18.
a metaphorical expression of the opinion that this object is connected
with the intellect through the same relation that takes place between
the known and the knower.” (C.P.8.18). He added that: “A realist can-
not imagine the mind as such a container that when an object is in it, it
at the same time cannot be beyond it.” Finally, a realist “does not dif-
ferentiate between the existence beyond the mind from being in the
mind as two non matching methods »of existence«”; both quotations
come from C.P.8.16. A very important inference can be drawn from
the words quoted: although the phenomena according to the defini-
tion exist in the mind, they do not necessarily have to be mind’s enti-
ties in the traditional meaning of the word; ‘phenomen’ (‘phaneron’)
is neither a metaphysical nor psychological term.
18 Compare the following remark about Adam’s terminal character
of the Firstness category: “What the world was to Adam on the day he
opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had be-
come conscious of his own experience – that is first, present, immedi-
ate,  fresh,  original,  spontaneous,  free,  vivid,  conscious  evanescent.
Only,  remember  that  every  description  of  it  must  be  false  to  it”.
Quoted  by:  A.W. Levi,  “Peirce  and  Painting”,  Philosophy  and  Phe-
nomenological Research XXII 1, 1962, p. 34.
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The meaning of the first principle has already been explained.
The second is its consequence; it consists of (in its contents) the de-
mand for resignation from the not necessary assumptions for an
immanent  description  of  a  phenomenon,  mainly  metaphysical,
psychological ones and those connected with natural science. Un-
doubtedly,  Peirce,  as  a phenomenologist,  accepted and required
that  and  only  that  type  of  non-assuming19.  Husserl’s  example
seems to be more complicated, though, Cunningham correctly re-
called Spiegelber’s and Marvin Farber’s opinions in this context20.
They  both  agreed  that  those  are  mistaken  who  understand
Husserl’s  ideal  of  non-conditioning  as  an  absolute  freedom  of
thoughts from all assumptions. And they were probably right. If it
had been differently, what than could mean the Husserl’s famous
words about solely phasic character of even the most radically con-
ducted research?
As can be guessed now, phaneroscopy and phenomenology are
connected by the strong anti-psychological  tendency21.  Astound-
ingly, this relation is made visible in Peirce’s short but harsh criti-
cism towards Husserl. The first thought about the latter much the
same as Leon Chwistek about Roman Ingarden – that beyond the
externals of antipsychological rhetoric he hides his psychologism
of the clear water (C.P.4.7), a basic mistake that involves blending
of what is logical with what is psychical. Who was right is the least
important thing here. It is only worth mentioning that this opinion
noted in a quite extraordinary way uncovers the partial connection
of those two projects discussed.
The peculiarity of Peirce’s project lies in the fact that antipsy-
chologism  pushed  him  towards  formalism  more  visibly  than  it
pushed Husserl22, which can be seen in the following confession:
“So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is oc-
19 Cf. J. Ransdell, “Peirce est-ill...”, op cit., p. 7.
20 S. Cunningham, Language and... , op.cit., p. 3; the author used the
following works: (a) H. Spiegelberg,  The Phenomenological Movement,
The Hague 1960, (b) M. Farber, “The Ideal of a Presuppositionless Phi-
losophy”, in:  Phenomenology. Ed. J.J. Kockelmans. New York: Garden
City, 1967.
21 Cf. e.g. C.P.l.285.
22 It is impossible to think even about some materialistic quasi-apri-
ori [formalism],  while  being at  Peirce’s  ground of  phenomenology.
However, Husserl’s phenomenology allows this kind of a concept.
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cupied with the formal elements of phaneron” (C.P.1.284). All that
has been already said was long time ago summed up by Jakobson,
who  called  Peirce  a  structural  phenomenologist23.  It  is  a  good
name,  although  the  conclusion  of  the  Ransdell’s  article  is  also
good: if phenomenology had gone towards the direction shown by
the American philosopher, it would have lost many features char-
acteristic to its continental shape.
Let us conclude citing the note about the feature that was saved
in phaneroscopy only because Peirce did not follow in Husserl’s
steps – its relation to the mathematics. The spirit of the mathemat-
ics that had discreetly but permanently invaded the Logische Unter-
suchungen, and later on even Formale und transzendetale Logik, later
on clearly, though gradually, abandoned Husserl’s thoughts. And
in the essays written by his disciples, phenomenology and math-
ematics were ultimately separated, with not a very good result for
the first one (but who today estimates it like that?). Phaneroscopy,
on the other hand, remained faithful to the mathematics. Why? –
let Peirce’s words be the answer: phenomenology24 “which does
not depend upon any other positive science25, nevertheless must, if
it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon the Condi-
tional or Hypothetical Science of Pure  Mathematics26,  whose only
aim is to discover not how things actually are, but how they might
supposed  to  be,  if  not  in  our  universe,  that  in  some  other”
(C.P.5.40). This comment reveals the fundamental, almost dramatic
difference between the epistemological status of phaneroscopy and
phenomenology – therefore it is necessary to retain not only this
terminological distinction. And, apart from this, the answer to the
question appearing in the title of  Randell’s  essay  Peirce est-il  un
phénoménologue should be positive: in the systematic sense, Peirce
is a phenomenologist.
23 Cf. R. Jakobson, „Kilka uwag o Peirce’ie poszukiwaczu dróg w
nauce o języku”. Transl. S. Adamski, in: R. Jakobson, W poszukiwaniu
istoty języka. Vol. 2. Ed. M.R. Mayenowa. Warszawa 1989.
24 Which can be read as phaneroscopy.
25 The word “other” appears here, as for Peirce phaneroscopy is a positive one
science.
26 What is pure mathematics for Peirce cf. C.P.4.233.
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